Individual responsibility for carbon emissions: Is there anything wrong with overdetermining harm? by Barry, Christian & Øverland, Gerhard
 1 
Individual responsibility for carbon emissions: Is there anything 
wrong with overdetermining harm?∗ 
 
Christian Barry (ANU) and Gerhard Øverland (Oslo) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Climate change and other harmful large-scale processes challenge our understandings of 
individual responsibility. People throughout the world suffer harms—severe shortfalls in 
health, civic status, or standard of living relative to the vital needs of human beings—as a 
result of physical processes to which many people appear to contribute. Climate change, 
polluted air and water, and the erosion of grasslands, for example, occur because a great 
many people emit carbon and pollutants, build excessively, enable their flocks to 
overgraze, or otherwise stress the environment. If a much smaller number of people 
engaged in these types of conduct, the harms in question would not occur, or would be 
substantially lessened. However, the conduct of any particular person (and, in the case of 
climate change, of even quite large numbers of people) could make no apparent 
difference to their occurrence. My carbon emissions (and quite possibly the carbon 
emissions of much larger groups of people dispersed throughout the world) may not 
make a difference to what happens to anyone. When the conduct of some agent does not 
make any apparent difference to the occurrence of harm, but this conduct is of a type 
that brings about harm because many people engage in it, we can call this agent an 
overdeterminer of that harm, and their conduct overdetermining conduct.1  
What is the moral status of overdeterming harm? Four questions lurk within this 
broad one. First, are there moral reasons against becoming an overdeterminer of harm? 
Second, if there are such moral reasons, what is their basis?2 Third, do overdeterminers 
have moral reasons to provide compensation or other forms of reparation to those who 
suffer overdetermined harms? Fourth, what should overdeterminers of harm do with the 
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1 Although individual agents are discussed in this chapter, the analysis can be extended to collective agents 
as well. 
2 Following Joseph Raz, let us understand a ‘reason’ as a consideration in favour of some act, ‘which by 
itself is sufficient to necessitate a certain course of action, provided no other factors defeat it.’ (Raz 1990, p. 
19). Those who claim that there are overdetermination-based moral reasons against φ-ing are committed at 
a minimum to the view that this reason will be sufficient to necessitate their refraining from φ-ing, 
provided no other factors militate in favour of φ-ing. They may differ, of course, about just how weighty 
overdetermination-based reasons are, relative to other sorts of reasons. 
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benefits that they have derived from their conduct? While all of the issues raised by these 
questions are important (and clearly interconnected), the first two—concerning reasons 
against overdeterming harm and their moral basis—seem most fundamental. If there 
were moral reasons against overdetermining harm, it would be relatively easy to 
understand why overdeterminers would owe compensation to those who have been 
harmed, and why they would be required to share the benefits that their overdetermining 
conduct produces. 
It is not always obvious whether or not the conduct of particular agents 
overdetermines harms or whether, on the contrary, the conduct of each is necessary for 
the occurrence of some particular harm. Individual contributions to climate change may 
be like this. It is certainly possible that an individual person might, through their carbon 
emissions, make some difference to the occurrence of harm to other particular people, in 
the sense that if they acted differently these people would not have been harmed.  If this 
were generally the case, then the issue of overdetermining harm would not be of critical 
importance to moral thinking about individual responsibility relating to climate change. 
But in general it seems very unlikely that individual carbon emissions really make a 
difference to the occurrence of any particular harm (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). Some 
authors avoid the implication that individual carbon emission is a case of 
overdetermining harm. In a recent article, for example, John Nolt tries to undermine the 
idea that ‘the harm caused by an individual’s participation in a greenhouse-gas-intensive 
economy is negligible’ (Nolt 2011, p. 3). He estimates the harmful impact of the ‘average 
American's’ carbon emissions by dividing the harm that will be generated by the total 
amount of carbon emitted by Americans as a group, and then dividing it by the number 
of Americans. He concludes that by this measure the average American’s carbon 
emissions will be responsible for the deaths or suffering of two future people. To be 
sure, if each individual American had reason to believe that refraining from emitting 
carbon excessively might make the difference to whether two future people die 
prematurely or not, this would give them a very stringent reason not to do so. But while 
Nolt’s accounting exercise may have some uses for moral assessment, his finding is 
consistent with its being the case that the total amount of harm caused by carbon 
emissions would be the same whether or not any particular American changed the 
amount of carbon they emitted. If this is so, then it would be true of each American that 
their carbon emissions make no difference to the occurrence of harm to particular 
people—each could vanish from the face of the earth without the reduced emissions 
meaning that two future people are saved from premature death. And if it is true of each 
American that they would not make such a difference to particular people, then they 
would be overdeterminers of harm in our sense. This is not to say that individuals are not 
overdeterminers of each and every harm engendered by climate change. John Broome, 
for instance, reports that an average adult in a rich country emits around 800 tonnes of 
GHGs in her lifetime (Broome 2012, p. 74), and claims that it is very likely that their 
cumulative emissions will indeed make difference to the occurrence of harm (pp. 74-78). 
Assuming that Broome is correct, there will nevertheless be many harms that individuals 
overdetermine through their conduct, additional to whatever harms are counterfactually 
dependent on their individual carbon emissions. Consequently, the stringency of reasons 
to refrain from emitting carbon or to compensate for their doing so will depend in some 
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measure on the moral status of overdetermining harm. 
 
So it is important to examine the issues of moral reasons against overdeterming 
harm (we’ll refer to these as overdetermination-based constraints) and their bases, and 
that’s the task we shall undertake in this chapter. We survey some proposed rationales for 
these constraints and note some of the criticisms to which they seem vulnerable. We 
then propose what we take to be a more promising alternative account.   
 
Preliminaries 
Doing harm 
In exploring the idea of overdetermination-based constraints, we shall restrict our 
discussion here to cases in which the type of conduct in question does harm, rather than 
merely fails to prevent it or contributes to it in some other way (e.g. by enabling it to 
occur, or by facilitating its occurrence).3 While the proper way to characterize the 
distinction between doing harm and merely allowing or enabling it to occur remains 
controversial, clear-cut instances of doing harm typically have two features, and we will 
discuss cases in which the agent’s conduct possesses them.  
The first feature is what might be called relevant action. If Sue is linked to John’s 
injuries by relevant action, then there is an answer to the question of how she was relevant 
to his injuries that refers to some act of hers. In a car crash in which Sue’s car runs over 
John, Sue becomes relevant to John’s broken leg by driving into him. The answer to the 
how question refers to an action of hers—her driving the car in a particular way and at a 
particular time. The second feature is that there is a complete causal process that links Sue’s 
relevant action to John’s injuries.4 That is, there is an intact sequence linking the relevant 
action of Sue with the fracture of John’s leg. In a car crash this intact sequence takes the 
form of a physical process involving the transfer of energy and momentum from Sue to 
John—a complete energy momentum sequence connects them.5  
All other things being equal, moral reasons associated with doing harm that 
possess these features are commonly thought to have several important normative 
characteristics. First and foremost, there are stringent constraints against engaging in 
such conduct. They are stringent in the sense that prospective doers of harm cannot 
easily justify their conduct by appealing to the costs to themselves of refraining from 
doing harm, nor by appealing to the overall good that their conduct will bring about. 
And they are stringent in the sense that they demand much of agents who have ignored 
these constraints, but are now in a position to mitigate or alleviate the harm that they 
have done. 
                                                
3 The distinctions between doing, allowing, and enabling harm are discussed in detail in Barry and 
Øverland (2012). 
4 Ned Hall (2002; 2004) refers to causal connections of this kind as exhibiting ‘locality’.  
5 This is not the only form that such processes can take. If John opens a dam and the water floods the 
town below, he does not transfer energy to the dam or the water, but rather releases stored energy that was 
being held at bay by the dam. For a short useful discussion of the different ways the idea of a complete 
process might be conceived, see Schaffer (2003, p. 32). 
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Sue has a stringent moral reason not to drive into and maim an innocent person, 
even if it is the only way she can avoid losing her own hand, or protect her child from 
suffering a broken leg. On the other hand, the fact that Sue would lose a hand or that her 
child would suffer a broken leg were she instead to intervene in a traffic incident to help 
an innocent person escape significant injury is ordinarily thought to provide justification 
(or at least a very good excuse) for her failure to help. In addition, the potential victims 
have claims against prospective doers of harm that they not harm them. Moreover, these 
claims are enforceable—potential victims (or third parties acting on their behalf) can 
enforce these claims through the proportional use of force. For instance, Sue may be 
prevented from killing a pedestrian with her car even if this involves injuring her 
significantly. Even when it is, all things considered, permissible or even obligatory to do 
harm to innocent non-threatening people (bystanders), compensation is typically owed to 
those who are harmed. This is because their stringent claims against having harm done to 
them have been infringed, however justifiably.6  
 All we have done so far is describe what we take to be widely accepted views about 
the normative significance of doing harm, and the way this category differs from allowing 
harm. Whether moral reasons associated with doing harm really have such significances 
remains a matter of philosophical debate. We won’t join in this controversy here. We 
shall simply assume that reasons based on doing harm possess the characteristics that 
commonsense morality accord to them, and plumb the significance of this assumption 
for the issue of overdetermining harm. Do particular overdeterminers harm others? The 
answer to this question depends very much on the conception of harm that is adopted. 
Some conceptions of harm that make counterfactual dependence essential for the 
attribution of harm will clearly not treat individual overdeterminers as harming others.7 
Conceptions of harm that make the attribution of harm depend on whether an individual 
is involved in the production of bad states of others, on the other hand, may count 
individual overdeterminers as harming.8  Since the questions we have raised concerning 
the moral status of overdetermining harm are of interest whether or not individual 
overdeterminers are taken to harm others, we shall bypass discussion of the appropriate 
account of harm. 
 
What is overdetermining harm? 
To help fix ideas and make our discussion more concrete, let us introduce a few 
variations of a simple imaginary case that we hope can shed light on the more complex 
cases—such as individual carbon emissions—with which this volume is concerned.  
 A person—Robinson—is living relatively well on his small island. However, the 
water in the lake surrounding his island starts to rise. At some point the island is 
swallowed up as a result of the rising water levels, and Robinson drowns. 51 people have 
engaged in a type of conduct—shovelling excess waste from their gardens into the 
lake—that has led to the rising water levels. Tom is one of the 51: he digs in his garden 
to extract some valuables, and shovels the excess waste into the lake. Tom’s conduct 
                                                
6 For discussion, see Thomson (1977). 
7 For discussion see Hanser (2008), Thomson (2011), and Bradley (2012). 
8 For discussion see Shiffrin (2010) and Harman (2009). 
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alone would not have resulted in Robinson’s death. Unfortunately, 50 other people also 
shovel their waste into the lake. As a result, water levels rise and Robinson is drowned. 
Consider three versions of this story (only one of which (it turns out) is an 
instance of overdetermining harm, as we have defined this notion).  
Robinson I: Tom’s disposing of his waste is necessary for the flooding of the 
island and the drowning of Robinson. Although 50 others shovel waste into the 
lake, it is nevertheless the case that if Tom were to have abstained, Robinson 
would not have drowned.  
Robinson II: Tom’s disposing of his waste makes no apparent difference to the 
drowning of Robinson. 50 others shovel waste into the lake and that number, or 
less than that number, is enough to drown Robinson. If Tom were to have 
abstained, the island would still have been flooded, and Robinson would still have 
drowned.  
Robinson III: Tom’s disposing of his waste makes no apparent difference to the 
drowning of Robinson. He shovels his waste into the lake after many others have 
disposed of their waste, and after this has already led to the flooding of the island 
and the drowning of Robinson.  
We’ll assume throughout this chapter (unless otherwise specified) that the situations are 
transparent to Tom and others in each of these cases. In Robinson I, Tom is not an 
overdeterminer with respect to Robinson’s death. Why? Because Robinson’s death would 
in this case be counterfactually dependent on Tom’s conduct. Had Tom refrained from 
shovelling his waste into the lake, Robinson would not have drowned. In this scenario 
Robinson’s vulnerability is obviously a very good reason for Tom not to shovel his waste 
into the lake.9  
In Robinson III, Robinson’s death is not counterfactually dependent on Tom’s 
conduct. Moreover, it is clear that there is no intact causal sequence that links Tom’s 
conduct with Robinson’s death. Robinson has already drowned when Tom shovels his 
waste into the lake. Consequently, Tom is not an overdeterminer of Robinson's death in 
this case. In the absence of some independent and negative consequence of his disposing 
of his waste in this way (perhaps it shows disrespect of some sort), it is hard to see why 
Tom has any reason to refrain from acting as he does in Robinson III. It does not seem 
that there is any claim of Robinson’s that would be infringed by Tom’s conduct.10 
In Robinson II, by contrast, Tom is an overdeterminer of Robinson’s death. 
Robinson’s death is not counterfactually dependent on Tom’s conduct (he would have 
died whether or not Tom disposed his waste), but it is nevertheless the case that if Tom 
and enough others shovel their waste into the lake, Robinson will drown. Further, there 
may be an intact sequence linking Tom’s conduct and Robinson’s death in Robinson II 
(but, since it is overdetermined, there may not). If there are overdetermination-based 
                                                
9 This is precisely the sort of reason Broome stresses when condemning carbon emissions without 
counterveiling offsets (see Broome 2012, esp. pp.50-55, 96). 
10 Insofar as compensation is owed to Robinson’s relatives, it would seem to be owed by the others who 
shovel waste prior to the water reaching the stage where it causes his death, but not by Tom. 
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constraints, then all else being equal it would be wrong of Tom to dispose of his waste in 
Robinson II. 
Existing approaches to overdetermining harm 
Scepticism 
It might be argued that there is no constraint against Tom’s disposing of his waste in 
Robinson II. After all, one might reasonably believe that the reason why there are 
constraints against certain types of conduct is that by engaging in them one tends to 
make other people worse off, or at least imposes a risk on others that they might be 
made worse off. In situations of overdetermination, however, this is not the case. 
Robinson will not be made worse off if Tom shovels his waste into the lake on this 
particular occasion. Recall that we are assuming that the fact that the conduct will make 
Tom an overdeterminer is transparent to him and others. The sceptic claims that while it 
might be true that the agent’s particular action would ordinarily have been wrong because 
it would have done harm to the victim, he does nothing wrong by performing that action 
in this particular case, because he makes no difference to what happens to the victim. 
There is some evidence that the law, at least, frees overdeterminers of harm from 
responsibility in some cases.11 This line seems consonant with the general view of 
morality endorsed by Frank Jackson (1997): 
the morality of an action depends on the difference it makes; it depends, that is, 
on the relationship between what would be the case were the act performed and 
what would be the case were the act not performed. 
 
This view has been sympathetically explored (though not endorsed) in application to the 
case of climate change by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2005).12  
The sceptic claims that there are no overdetermination-based constraints. He 
believes that all else being equal Tom has no reason not to dispose of his waste in 
Robinson II. When Tom shovels his waste into the lake, he obtains benefits without 
worsening anyone’s situation, and this gives him a good reason to do it. Correspondingly, 
Robinson has no claim against Tom that he refrain from the overdetermining conduct. 
Of course, many people seem to think that there is something wrong about Tom’s 
conduct in Robinson II. They find it problematic that Tom can φ when φ-ing is a type of 
action that alone or in conjunction with the actions of others could bring about severe 
harm, even though on this particular occasion the harm will occur whether or not Tom 
φs, because many others will φ. But the skeptic may be able to provide plausible 
explanations for this intuition without attributing any moral significance to conduct that 
overdetermines harm. For example, they can argue (in a Lockean vein) that because we 
strongly associate φ-ing with certain harms, this leaves a kind of psychological trace that 
we cannot easily free ourselves from. This inclines us to condemn an agent’s φ-ing even 
when her φ-ing is not necessary for the harm to occur. 
                                                
11 These are the asymmetrical concurrent cause cases, the symmetrical concurrent cause cases where one 
sufficient cause is a natural event, and the damage limitation rule in cases of preemptive causation. For 
discussion, see Moore (2003, pp. 1264–66). 
12 See also the discussion in Garrett Cullity’s chapter in this volume. 
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Moreover, intuitions about overdetermining harm cases could stem from the 
belief that we rarely can be certain whether our conduct will make a difference to what 
happens to others. And when we are uncertain whether harm counterfactually depends 
on our φ-ing, this obviously gives us a reason not to φ. Perhaps many people condemn 
agents like Tom in cases like Robinson II because they feel that no one could ever really 
be so sure that their shovelling of waste would make no difference to the outcome. 
Without a positive justification for constraints against overdetermining harm, this sort of 
‘debunking’ explanation of people’s intuitions about them would be hard to resist. This 
does not mean that the skeptic’s position comes without cost. In particular, it seems 
plausible that, where it suddenly to become possible for Robinson or a third party to 
intervene to protect him in a way that would impose significant cost on each 
overdeterminer, it would be permissible to do this. How much cost? Certainly much 
more cost than could be imposed on an innocent bystander who was in no way related to 
Robinson’s plight. In general, how much cost we can impose on the agent without 
violating his rights seems to depend in large measure on how much cost this agent would 
be required to bear in the first place. For example, it seems impermissible for one agent 
to compel another to do X unless that agent is morally required to do X. So the skeptic 
will either need to claim that it is in fact impermissible to impose more cost on the 
overdeterminers than on an innocent bystander, or explain how it overdeterminers can at 
once be liable to bear more cost to avert the prospective harm to Robinson without 
having a duty to take on cost to avoid harming him. 
 
Still, skepticism about overdetermining harm is a powerful position, and one that 
we shall not attempt to disprove here. The appeal of scepticism could be blunted 
considerably if a plausible positive account of these constraints can be provided, 
however, and that is what we shall try to do. 
So let’s explore some existing justifications for overdetermination-based 
constraints to see whether they hold promise.13 Our aim in exploring them is not to 
provide knockdown arguments against them. Rather, we indicate the sort of objections 
to which they are vulnerable. We think these objections are serious (even if they could 
ultimately be met) and warrant exploration of alternative justifications for constraints 
against overdetermining harm that are not vulnerable to them. 
Absolutism 
It might be argued that since φing is the sort of action that typically has bad 
consequences, it is simply wrong to φ, even if in certain circumstances φing makes no 
one worse off. Following Jonathan Bennett, let us distinguish between absolutism and 
relativism about types of conduct.14 Absolutism about φing is the thesis that it could never 
                                                
13 Our list includes what we take to be the most promising existing justifications for the constraints in 
question, and is not exhaustive (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2005 for some other arguments that we do not 
consider). 
14 As Bennett (1995, pp. 165–71) notes, when contrasting absolutism and relativism we ought not to 
describe the kind of behaviour whose moral status is in question in terms of its overall consequences. There 
is substantive dispute between absolutism and relativism about the wrongness of engaging in some conduct 
when that conduct is described as ‘killing an innocent person when there is no good to be achieved by so 
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be right to φ. Relativism about φing is the thesis that it can be permissible to φ in some 
possible circumstances, but that it may not be permissible in others. 
It is controversial whether absolutism about any type of conduct is plausible 
(Anscombe 1961; Bennett 1995). However, even if one could make a case for absolutism 
about some types of conduct—shooting or torturing innocent non-threatening people, 
for example—it is extremely unlikely that a case can be made for absolutism about many 
of the types of conduct that are involved in overdetermination cases. If no one were 
made worse off or rendered unduly vulnerable as a result of our emitting high levels of 
carbon or shovelling waste into lakes, how could it possibly be wrong for us to do these 
things? 
The universalization requirement 
One might appeal to Kant-inspired arguments as a basis for overdetermination-based 
moral reasons. That is, in deliberating about whether or not she can φ, the agent must 
not think in terms of whether or not her φing would make a morally relevant difference 
in this instance, but whether it would make a morally relevant difference if everyone φed, 
or (to take another version of the universalization test) if everyone who was inclined to φ 
did so.15 Clearly, the conduct that universalization tests would rule out as impermissible 
would seem to depend very much on how the conduct is described. If Tom’s conduct in 
Robinson II is described as ‘shovelling waste into the lake’, then perhaps this test will 
require that the agent not engage in it, since morally unacceptable consequences (e.g. 
Robinson’s death) would result were everyone to do it, or even if everyone who is 
inclined to do so does it. If the conduct in Robinson II is instead described in terms of 
‘shovelling waste into the river when doing so makes no difference to anyone’, then it is 
likely that the conduct would not be ruled out by the universalization test. As Parfit puts 
it, ‘if my contribution would make no difference, I can rationally will that everyone else 
does what I do. I can rationally will that no one contributes when he knows that his 
contribution would make no difference.’ (Parfit 1983, p. 87) 
One could insist that in formulating the universalization test we should describe 
the conduct in a way that does not include the incorporation of any contextual features 
based on what others will do or are likely to do. Allowing the incorporation of such 
features seems to invite agents to concoct ‘gimmicky’ maxims that effectively circumvent 
the universalization tests, rather than apply them sincerely (Pogge 1998). The main 
drawback to this proposal is that, if we exclude such contextual information, the 
universalization test is very likely to yield results about how agents ought to behave that 
in many cases are difficult to accept. It seems very important that we be able to consider 
the likelihood that other people will behave in certain ways when we are deliberating 
about what we are permitted to do, rather than assuming away such information. To 
borrow an example of Jonathan Glover’s, I may not be able to rationally will that 
everyone be heavily armed, but it does not follow from this that I may not heavily arm 
myself when I know that others around me are heavily armed (Glover 1977, p. 131). 
                                                                                                                                       
doing’. The conduct must be described in such a way as not to invoke an overall moral assessment—it is 
not controversial that there is an absolute moral prohibition against ‘impermissibly killing someone’. 
15 See Pogge (1998) for discussion of this version of the test. 
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Overdetermination as contribution: necessary elements of a sufficient set 
A very different proposal for justifying overdetermination-based constraints is to say that 
overdeterminers contribute to overdetermined harms, not by becoming a difference 
maker with respect to their occurrence, but by becoming necessary elements in a set of 
actual antecedent conditions that is sufficient for bringing those harms about—a ‘NESS’ 
condition for their occurrence.16 An agent’s conduct is a NESS for some harm only if it 
was a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for its 
occurrence. Richard Wright (1985) explains this notion as follows: 
[A] particular condition was a cause of (condition contributing to) a specific 
consequence if and only if it was a Necessary Element of a Set of antecedent 
actual conditions that was Sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence.17 
According to some theorists, NESS conditions provide the best available analysis of the 
concept of causation.18 Wright, for example, claims that the NESS idea ‘not only resolves 
but also clarifies and illuminates the causal issues in the problematic causation cases that 
have plagued tort scholars for centuries’, but that it ‘is the essence of the concept of 
causation’ (Wright 1985, pp. 1802, 1805).   
In Robinson II, Tom’s conduct is indeed a necessary element of some actual set 
of conditions that was sufficient for its occurrence, even if disposing of the waste of 40 
would suffice to flood the island. When Tom throws waste into the lake in this case, his 
conduct becomes a necessary element in an actual set of conditions comprising it and, for 
instance, the conduct of others (1, 2, 3 … 38 and 39) who shovel waste in the lake. 
Together these 40 people would flood the island. And this, of course, is true of each of 
the 51 waste throwers. It is true of each that their waste disposal was a necessary element 
of a set of actual antecedent conditions—namely, any set excluding the waste disposal of 
11 others, but including that of 39 others, which was sufficient to bring about the 
outcome. A plurality of sets of actual antecedent conditions was sufficient for Robinson’s 
death. It is not the case that the conduct of any one of the 51 waste throwers was 
necessary for the sufficiency of all of these sets, but the conduct of each was necessary 
for the sufficiency of some of them. 
On this view, there are overdetermination-based constraints against Tom’s 
throwing waste in Robinson II, because by doing so he would become a contributor 
(NESS) to the outcome. Insofar as we accept that the reasons against becoming a 
contributor to harm are ordinarily quite stringent, then there is nothing mysterious about 
there being such reasons against Tom’s shovelling his waste into the lake in Robinson II. 
While this approach might rescue the idea that there are overdetermination-based 
constraints, in our view it does so by invoking an extremely implausible notion of 
                                                
16 This view of contribution is developed by Hart and Honoré (1985). They acknowledge that it builds on 
J. S. Mill's notion of a jointly sufficient set of conditions, as well as on Mackie's (1980) idea, in the context 
of causal generalizations, of an INUS condition (an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but 
sufficient condition). 
17 Capitals added to clarify the acronym.  
18 Hart and Honoré do not make any such claim.  
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contributing to harm. A well-known example from the literature on causation (cf. Lewis 
2000) helps illustrate this. Bill and Ben each throw a rock towards a window. The 
window shatters. They are convicted of vandalism, and are required to compensate the 
shopkeeper. Alice has it all on tape. A closer look reveals that it was only Bill’s rock that 
hit the window. Ben’s rock followed its trajectory soon thereafter, passing through the 
shattered glass, but without hitting it—it did not change the timing or the manner of the 
occurrence of the shattering of the window. To say that Ben contributed to the 
shattering of the window when neither he nor his rock came into contact with the glass 
(and where no energy was transferred from the approaching rock to the glass) is 
implausible. Ben was accordingly not a contributor to the breaking of the window, and 
any understanding of contribution that maintains that he did contribute to this outcome 
is implausible. 
Some legal theorists nevertheless seem to favour this NESS account of 
contribution in allocating costs for accidents and punishments for crime (Stapleton 
2008). It is not difficult to understand why, given that many legal systems currently make 
causal contribution to harm a condition for liability to bear cost to address it (American 
Law Institute 1965). One might be concerned that overdeterminers will be let off the 
legal hook unless one adopts a NESS account of causal contribution, or something akin 
to it. The correct response to this, however, is not to pretend that an agent contributes to 
something by saying that he is a NESS of it. Ben does not contribute to (although he is a 
NESS of) the breaking of the window in the case imagined above. If we believe that 
overdeterminers should be made liable for the costs of their conduct, we should instead 
conclude that there are good grounds to change the requirements for liability. There 
might be good reasons to make both Bill and Ben bear the cost of repairing the window, 
and good reasons perhaps to punish them. Making actual contribution to harm a 
requirement for duties to provide compensation to the victims of harm could be 
questionable, morally speaking (Waldron 1995). 
A consequentialist solution? 
Shelly Kagan has recently tried to address our question regarding overdetermination-
based constraints from a consequentialist perspective. At first glance, the idea of 
consequentialist support for overdetermination-based constraints does not appear 
promising. After all, consequentialism enjoins agents to focus on the differences that 
they can make to outcomes that are morally significant; and the cases we have been 
discussing are precisely those where it seems that no one person makes a difference to 
harmful outcomes by φing. However, Kagan argues, on the contrary, that in the case that 
concerns us the expected disvalue of engaging in overdetermining conduct will outweigh 
its expected value, and is thus easily handled with ordinary consequentialist machinery. 
Kagan distinguishes between two basic types of overdetermination cases, which he refers 
to as ‘triggering cases’ and ‘imperceptible difference cases’ (Kagan 2011, pp. 117-118). 
Our Robinson example is clearly a triggering case, so we will focus on Kagan’s treatment 
of this type. 
In triggering cases, he claims, the action of each person involved most likely 
makes ‘no difference at all’ (Kagan 2011, p. 118). However, there is some act that triggers 
the morally relevant outcome. He illustrates this idea through the example of individual 
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contributions to the killing of commercially raised chickens. He proposes that poultry 
sales typically function by way of thresholds.19 
 
presumably it works something like this: there are, perhaps, 25 chickens in a 
given crate of chickens. So the butcher looks to see if 25 chickens have been 
sold, so as to order 25 more … When 25 have been sold this triggers the call to 
the chicken farm, and 25 more chickens are killed, and another 25 eggs are 
hatched and raised in torture. (Kagan 2011, p. 122). 
 
In this case, he claims, it is true that a great many chicken purchases make no difference 
to the number of chickens tortured and killed. This is because it makes no difference 
‘whether 7, 13 or 23 chickens have been sold’ (Kagan 2011, p. 122). So those who buy 
the 7th, 13th or 23rd chicken will make no difference to the number of chickens tortured 
and slaughtered. The person who buys the 25th chicken, however, will make a difference 
to that number: their purchase will lead to a call to the chicken farm. On Kagan’s view 
then, what could make it wrong to shovel waste into the lake in our Robinson case is that 
when each person acts there is some probability that their shovelling will be what 
triggers—makes a difference to—the morally relevant outcome (in this case Robinson's 
death). 
This  argument shows, we think, that the consequentialist can often give reasons 
why people should refrain from acts that they believe may overdetermine harm. We don’t 
think, however, that it shows that the consequentialist has a reason why people should 
refrain from such acts when—as in our Robinson case— it is known that they will 
overdetermine harm. In our Robinson case, it is not true of the agent that there is some 
chance that their conduct will make a difference to the morally relevant outcome. In fact, 
they know that it won’t. Kagan himself admits that in variations of his cases where the 
number of people buying chickens is not a multiple of 25, all can truly say that their 
purchase made no difference to the amount of chicken suffering. (Kagan 2011, p. 128). 
So our question is whether in cases like this there is any reason for a particular person to 
refrain from chicken purchasing. And here it is hard to see how the consequentialist can 
respond. They can only say, as Kagan himself seems to admit, that we often have no idea 
whether or not we are necessary elements of a triggering cohort that makes a difference 
to the occurrence of harm or members of a cohort that overdetermines it (such that no 
member is a necessary element of the set that triggers it.)  
It seems that Kagan also overstates the force of his response even in cases where 
agents lack knowledge about whether they will be overdeterminers of harm. For 
example, there may be many cases where the chance of making a morally relevant 
difference by φing is extremely small, whereas the expected value of φing is quite 
significant. So it is not true that appeals to expected utility will ‘guarantee’ that it is wrong 
to perform the overdetermining act (Kagan 2011, p. 120; as pointed out by Nefsky 2012, 
at p. 369). How likely is it that cases of overdetermination will be such that the expected 
disvalue of possibly being an agent that triggers harmful consequence by φing will give 
                                                
19 This same argument, made through the same example, was made previously by Peter Singer (Singer 1980 
at p.335). Curiously, Kagan does not cite Singer’s earlier treatment of this issue (in the very same journal.) 
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you reason to refrain from it, given what else is at stake? That seems to depend largely on 
the case that is being considered.  
In cases involving markets, such as those discussed by Kagan, there may be good 
reason to believe that individuals will have such reason. This is because, as he points out, 
there may be market incentives for poultry shops to want to ensure that the number of 
chickens they order is more or less the same as the number of purchases required before 
a new order is triggered. In this case, the chance that individuals will have made a 
difference to the overall number of chickens ordered may be (relatively) high. But this 
will not be true of all cases. With respect to environmental harms and climate change, for 
instance, there will be no mechanism of this sort. Here it may often be the case that 
overall contributions wildly overshoot the number needed to bring about the morally 
relevant outcome. And in this case the chance that any will have made a difference to the 
harm will be much lower. Since the expected disvalue of φing is a function of the 
significance of the potential harm caused by it and the likelihood that the particular φing 
will bring it about, it may vary a great deal from case to case, and consequently be more 
or less likely to outweigh the expected value of  φing.  
 
An alternative approach 
Levels of description 
Does overdetermination even exist? Some simply deny the existence of 
overdetermination in a world like ours, where there are certain lawful physical 
processes.20 To be sure, there are many situations in which some set of people appears to 
consist of overdeterminers with respect to some injury, but perhaps this is only because 
we lack the necessary detailed microanalysis of the situation and how it has come about. 
Accordingly, the question ‘what is wrong with being an overdeterminer of harm?’ would 
not even get off the ground.  
 Harms and other outcomes can be described generally—a window is broken, 
Robinson dies—or they can be described more specifically—the window breaks and 
Robinson dies at particular times and in particular ways. One can clearly be an 
overdeterminer of harms that are described at a very general, rough-grained level. 
However, it is very often the case that a person is not an overdeterminer with respect to 
the outcome when it is described in a more fine-grained fashion. Whether a person is an 
overdeterminer with respect to some outcome, then, seems to depend on the level of 
detail at which that outcome is described. It may well be that in a world such as ours no 
outcomes are overdetermined when they are described at a sufficiently fine-grained level 
of detail. 
 Consider again the case of the two rock throwers. Bill and Ben each throw rocks. 
The window shatters. They are convicted of vandalism, and required to compensate the 
shopkeeper. Alice has it all on tape. A close look reveals how the two rocks together 
break the window. Suppose that on the basis of this footage we can safely infer that the 
                                                
20 See Bunzl (1979). For arguments against this view, see Schaffer (2003), who claims that 
overdetermination is ‘everywhere’. 
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breaking and shattering of the window would have been slightly different had only one 
of the two rocks hit the window. At the rough-grained level of description, the outcome 
may be said to be the same as what would have occurred had either (but not both) of 
them thrown the rock—the window is shattered. The outcomes are different, however, 
when described in a finer-grained way—the manner in which the window shattered 
would have been different if one or the other rock alone had hit the window. There are 
consequently no overdeterminers with regard to the outcome described in this fine-
grained way—the precise manner in which the window was shattered.  
 Consider cases that are commonly described as involving pre-emptive 
overdetermination.21 In such cases, there are two events, each of which could be 
sufficient to cause some harm. However, one process pre-empts the ability of the other 
to bring about the harm. For instance, Al and Jonathan both start fires to burn down 
Martin’s house. Al’s fire reaches the house first and burns it down. While both Al and 
Jonathan are overdeterminers relative to the rough-grained description of the outcome 
(burning down the house), neither Al nor Jonathan is an overdeterminer relative to the 
fine-grained description of the outcome: Al’s fire burns down the house, and Jonathan’s 
doesn’t burn down anything. 
Of course, there are many other agents who may affect the timing and manner of 
occurrence of outcomes—including individuals who try to prevent these outcomes. 
Susanna’s phone call to distract Al from his mission may delay the burning down of 
Martin’s house, and change other details about its occurrence. However, it is not true of 
Susanna that there is an intact sequence linking her with the burning down of Martin’s 
house. She enabled the occurrence of the burning of the house in the way that it actually 
happened, but she clearly didn’t burn it down. 
In Robinson II, is Tom an overdeterminer with respect to the outcome when it is 
described in this fine-grained way? Suppose that 40 loads of waste would suffice to flood 
the island. Tom is among the 51 who throw waste into the lake. We need to know 
whether they are doing it at exactly the same time. If not, and they are at the same 
distance from the island, a detailed analysis is likely to reveal that it was the waste 
shovelled into the lake by the first 40 only that caused the water to rise above the island, 
and that the last 11 were not relevant to the killing of Robinson. Hence, the 40 who first 
threw their waste into the lake together killed Robinson by flooding the island, while the 
11 others did not contribute to his death. In this case, neither Tom nor the others would 
be overdeterminers of Robinson’s death when it is described in a fine-grained manner. 
Some of them would have contributed to it, others would not have. 
By contrast, if the 51 people threw the waste into the lake at exactly the same 
time, and they were at exactly the same distance from the lake, a detailed analysis of the 
situation is likely to show that each of them contributed to Robinson’s death—there 
would be intact causal sequences linking each person’s waste disposal with this 
drowning—some of the waste of each would be part of the process involving the raising 
of the water levels. They flooded the island with 40/51 = roughly 78 per cent of their 
waste. The rest of the waste of each was redundant. Hence, all 51 people contributed to 
                                                
21 These are sometimes referred to as Frankfurt-type cases, after Harry Frankfurt, who is credited with 
introducing them into the literature (Frankfurt 1969). 
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the flooding of the island, and there were no overdeterminers of the outcome described 
in a sufficiently fine-grained way. 
A proposal: probability of being a member of the actual set 
A fine-grained analysis seems to us to provide the correct diagnosis of who contributed 
to Robinson’s death. It fails, however, to explain the moral reasons that apply to Tom 
when he is considering whether he can throw waste into the lake. Learning whether or 
not Tom actually did or did not contribute to Robinson’s death as described in this fine-
grained way doesn’t really explain why it is wrong for him to dispose of his waste in the 
first place.  
The proposal here is that overdetermination-based constraints are based on the 
possibility that some agent will become a necessary element of the set of actual conditions 
that actually brings about the overdetermined outcome. The significance of the 
overdetermination-based constraint is therefore in an important way a function of the 
probability that by φing an agent will be member of this set. If the agent φs, then an 
overall moral appraisal of his conduct would also depend on the costs to him of 
refraining from φing and on his knowledge of the situation that he is in, as well as the 
benefits his conduct may produce for others. The higher the costs to him, the less 
transparent the situation, and the larger the benefits his conduct will produce for others, 
the less culpable he will be. 
This account of overdetermination-based constraints can be summed up as 
follows: 
The significance of overdetermination-based constraints (against φing) is a 
function of how bad the overdetermined outcome is and the probability that by 
φing this agent will be an element of the set of actual antecedent conditions that 
brings this outcome about. 
Assuming that the badness of the outcome is held constant, then the more unlikely it is 
that he will be among the actual set by his φing, the less significant his constraint against 
φing will be. If there is no risk that by φing the agent will be among the actual set of 
conditions that in fact does the harm, then there are no overdetermination-based 
constraints against her φing.22 
Consider how our proposed account applies to variations of Robinson II. 
Assuming that the necessary number of waste throwers is 40, then the significance of 
Tom’s overdetermination-based constraints against throwing waste into the lake is 
reduced when the number of other people throwing waste into the lake increases. This is 
because when the number of waste throwers increases, the probability that Tom will be a 
member of the actual set decreases. Holding the necessary number of waste throwers 
constant at 40 his probability will be 40/40, 40/41, 40/42, and so on. 
When holding the number of people throwing waste constant at 51, the 
significance of Tom’s overdetermination-based constraint against throwing waste into 
the lake will increase as the number of waste throwers required to flood the island 
                                                
22 The conduct may, of course, be wrong for some other reason. 
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increases. This is because the larger the number of waste throwers necessary to bring 
about Robinson’s drowning, the greater the likelihood that Tom will be a member of this 
set. For instance, if only one person is required, then the probability that he is a member 
of the actual set is 1/51, if two people are required, then the chance that he is among 
them is 2/51, and so forth, until the required number is 51, in which case he will certainly 
be a member of this set. 
Is the number of contributors relevant? 
When only one person needs to φ to bring about an outcome, and there are 51 people 
who φ, then the probability that any particular individual will be member of the actual set 
is much lower than if a larger number of people were required to bring it about. 
According to our proposal, this means that the overdetermination-based constraint 
against throwing waste will be correspondingly weaker on each than if a larger number of 
people were required. But perhaps there is an additional factor that we have failed to 
consider that might militate against this conclusion: the absolute number of people 
whose conduct will in fact bring about the outcome.23 If Tom should happen to be a 
member of the actual set that brought about the flooding when only one person is 
required to flood the island, he would be the lone contributor to Robinson’s death. This 
might seem to make a difference. Perhaps the size of the actual set is independently 
relevant for determining the significance of an agent’s constraint against becoming an 
overdeterminer. 
If this were true, then the size of the actual set necessary to do harm would be 
relevant for two separate assessments that together would determine the significance of 
an agent’s overdetermination-based constraint: (1) the probability that any given person 
will be a member of the actual set is relevant for gauging the significance of the 
overdetermination-based constraint against φing (the smaller the set, the less likely they 
are in it, and the less wrong their φing) and; (2) the amount of harm that each person in 
that set is responsible for is relevant for the general wrongness of being a member of the 
actual set (the smaller the set, the more harm each member of the set is responsible for). 
These two assessments could pull in different directions. The probability that an 
agent will become a member of the actual set by φing could be low. Correspondingly, the 
overdetermination-based constraint against φing is weak (on the first dimension). But if 
the agent nevertheless ends up as a member of the actual set, his role in bringing it about 
is substantial—he might even be the only one in the set—in which case his 
overdetermination-based constraint against φing would be stringent (on the second 
dimension.) 
  However, we are not convinced that the size of the set matters. Why should it 
matter that you are one of many when you are a necessary element in the actual set? 
Consider Robinson II. If it takes 51 people to kill Robinson, and that is well known by 
all, it is not clear that any one of them is any less to blame for his death than if one of 
them were to drown him alone. After all, each of them is in a position to avoid killing 
Robinson by refraining from pushing waste into the lake. That one person’s contribution 
depends on other factors to be effective doesn’t seem to alter the extent of her 
                                                
23 Thanks to Geoff Brennan for pointing out this possibility. 
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responsibility when she knows that these factors obtain, regardless of how many 
additional necessary factors there are. Looked at from another angle, each of these 
contributors would, it would seem, be liable to defensive force (should it become 
possible to defend Robinson) that would be comparable to that of one person whose 
conduct alone would be sufficient to drown him. As noted above, this seems a good 
indicator of the cost they would be obliged to take on to avoid contributing to harming 
Robinson. 
Nor is it obvious that the size of the actual set is of independent relevance, even 
when the agents involved do not know whether the other necessary factors obtain. When 
Tom considers whether or not to shovel waste into the lake, his uncertainty about 
whether or not enough others have done so that his conduct would combine with theirs 
to bring about Robinson’s death is obviously relevant to his decision. But it is not clear 
whether the numbers of factors that would have to be present for the outcome to be 
brought about is relevant in itself. When the conduct of many people is necessary for 
bringing about an outcome, then it will often be more difficult for any particular person 
to ascertain that they will become a contributor to this outcome if they φ. The true 
significance of numbers could therefore simply be that the more factors that are 
necessary to bring about some outcome, the more likely an agent is to be uncertain about 
whether his conduct will be necessary for it to occur.  
Stringency 
Our focus so far has been on proposing a way of understanding overdetermination-
based constraints that undermines the appeal of scepticism about reasons against 
overdetermining harm. But what of the view that Tom’s being an overdeterminer (rather 
than a necessary condition) of Robinson’s drowning makes no difference to the moral 
reasons that apply to Tom?24 That is, the constraints that apply to him are just as 
stringent as those that would apply were his conduct instead to be a necessary condition 
for the harm. 
This position is implausible. The fact that the bad outcome will happen whether 
or not Tom φs clearly should make a difference to the weight of reasons against his φing. 
This is supported by considered judgements in a range of cases. It seems to make a 
significant moral difference whether one is exposing someone to 1/51 risk of death or is 
instead an overdeterminer with a 1/51 risk of being among the actual set that kills a 
person. In both cases there is some possibility that you will kill him. But only in the 
former case is there a possibility that you will make a difference to whether or not he is 
killed. There seems also to be significant moral difference between Tom’s pulling the 
trigger of a Russian roulette gun with 51 chambers and his being one of 51 people 
shovelling waste into a lake (or one of 51 shooting at a person’s head, for that matter), 
when it takes only one to kill the victim. 
The fact that the bad outcome is going to happen whether or not one φs seems 
to function as a factor that reduces the stringency of moral reasons against φing. 
Moreover, the degree to which it reduces the significance of the overdetermination-based 
constraint depends crucially on the motives of the agent who is φing, and the interests 
                                                
24 This seems to be the position defended in Goldman (1999) and Tuck (2009, pp. 32–60).  
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that are served when he φs. As originally described, Tom shovels waste into the lake in 
Robinson II simply to get rid of it, because he can reap benefits from doing so, and for 
no other reason. However, we could modify the case to allow him other reasons for 
throwing the waste into the lake. For instance, he might need to get rid of it to save 
another person from drowning. In that case, it seems that the reasons against his 
throwing waste into the lake are outweighed by his positive reasons to save that person. 
And that seems to be the case even when the probability that he will be a member of the 
set that actually does harm to Robinson is very high. By contrast, it does not seem that 
he would be permitted to φ in order to save another person if his φing would drown 
Robinson when it is not the case that Robinson would have drowned anyway—we cannot 
do harm to one innocent person to save one other innocent person from a comparable 
harm to which we would not be a contributor.  
Earlier in this essay we noted that it was widely accepted that doers of harm 
cannot easily justify their conduct by appealing to the costs to them of refraining from 
doing harm, or to comparable harms that their conduct will prevent for others if they do 
harm. Our claim here is that it is much easier for overdeterminers to appeal to costs of 
these kinds to justify their conduct. Overdetermination-based constraints are simply not 
as significant as constraints against doing harm, when your conduct is necessary for harm 
being done. That the bad outcome is going to happen increases the plausibility of the 
appeal to cost or to prospective benefits for others. 
Could Tom invoke just any reason to protect another person from harm to 
override his overdetermination-based constraint against throwing waste when the island 
will be flooded whether or not he does so? If he could, this constraint would be 
extremely weak—hardly worth its name. It may seem plausible that these constraints are 
very weak when the probability that Tom will be a member of the actual set is very low. 
On the other hand, when the probability that he will be among the actual set is high, the 
fact that his conduct would bring minor benefits to him or others does not seem 
sufficient to override this constraint. If Alice needs to tidy up her garden, it seems wrong 
of Tom to help her by throwing the waste into the lake if the situation is as described in 
Robinson II. This is so even if the probability of his being among the actual set that 
causes the flooding is quite low—if 15 rather than 40 would suffice to bring it about. 
Although Robinson is going to drown anyway, Tom shouldn’t throw waste into the lake 
unless an interest of considerable moral significance is served by his doing so. And it 
seems that if he throws waste into the lake without this sort of justification, he would 
become liable to defensive force by Robinson or others acting on his behalf. 
What if Tom were to throw waste into the lake in Robinson II in order to benefit 
himself? It seems pretty obvious that he could do so if it were necessary to save his own 
life or avoid a very significant loss. But what if he instead stands to gain only significant 
monetary benefits? Suppose he is not throwing the waste simply to get rid of it, but 
because he must get dispose of it in order to extract some precious stones on his 
property. Suppose also that the only way to get rid of the waste is to throw it into the 
lake.  
As noted initially, the issue of what to do with the benefits of overdetermining 
conduct is a distinct matter that we cannot address in detail in this chapter. However, it 
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seems to us that Tom should not proceed in this case and claim all the benefits for 
himself in Robinson II. Even when the probability that an agent is member of the actual 
set that brings about some harm by φing is very low, he seems required to share the 
benefits with those harmed when this is possible, or with relevant third parties (e.g. 
relatives) when it is not. When the overdeterminer φs, he violates a constraint and 
correspondingly infringes the claim of the person that suffers the overdetermined harm. 
That he infringes a claim explains why it is impermissible for him to keep all the benefits 
for himself. If Tom ends up as an element in the actual set that brings about the outcome 
(described in a fine-grained way), then he seems to have no claim on the benefits he gains 
at all, and ought to compensate the victim as well.  
Compensation 
It is not obvious why anyone should provide compensation for victims of some harmful 
activity unless their conduct was in some way actually implicated in the harms that they 
have suffered. Compensation is due, in thef first instance, from those who ended up 
among the set that actually brought about the bad outcome, described in a fine-grained 
way. Sometimes, of course, we will be unable to determine who actually brought about 
the outcome described in such a way. In these cases, we propose that all of those who 
engaged in the activity ought to share equally the cost of compensation, all else being 
equal.25 How is it that we can require these people to compensate when we cannot tell 
for sure that they actually contributed to the outcome? We are entitled to do that, 
because these agents have all engaged in the wrongful action of taking a risk of becoming 
an element in the actual set that brought about the outcome. It is therefore fair that they 
compensate the victim, since the overdeterminers are owed no benefit of the doubt.26 
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